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Mmlllfacturcd in the United Statc:s of America 10 9 H 7 6 'i 4 1 2 Lihr;uy of Congress C:ataloging-in-l'uhlication Data SinHm, James F FDR and Chief justice Hughes: the president, the Supreme Court, and the epic hattie over the New l kal/ by James F. Simon. Prologue 0 n the gray, chilly morning ofNowmher 12, 1921, Charles Evans Hughe~, the fifty-nine-year-old US. Secretary of State, prepmed tu address delegates to the first intern:1tion:ll disarmament conference in more than a decade. Hughes hoped th:1t the venue fur the Washington Conference, C:ontinentall-bll, the quietly dignitJed building dedicated to the heroes of the American Revolution, offered more than a cosmetic contrast to the ornate French Foreign Ministry, the scene uf the Peace Conference held in P:1ris less than three years earlier. If the disarmament umference proceeded as Hughes planned, discussions would rise above the stubborn, selfish negotiations of the Paris conference. lie also expected participants to move beyond the grand platitudes of earlier disarmament conferences. Having insisted that the United States host the conference, he intended to pressure delegates representing the major naval powers (Cireat Britain, Japan, and the United State~) tu produce positive, tangible results that had eluded the world's best statesmen for two decades.
The distinguished Secretary of State, his full, white hemd immaculately gromned, sat in the center scat uf a lmge U-shapcd But when Hughes introduced his disarmament proposal, his voice suddenly rose to a dramatic, commanding pitch. "Competition-in armamentmust stop," he said emphatically. Actions, not words, were needed to end the competition, he declared, and promised that the United States would take the lead. On behalf of the U.S. government, he said, he was authorized to scrap all American warships under construction, including six battle cruisers and seven battleships (costing more than $330 million), as well as fifteen existing battleships. The total number of capital ships to he eliminated comprised an aggregate weight of R45, 7 40 tons. No nation had ever made such an offer to reduce its armaments. Hughes paused to let the delegates absorb his stunning statement. "With the :tccepr:mce uf this pLm," Hughes conclttded, "the hurden of meeting the dem:mds of competition in naval arm:lllll'Ilt will he lifted." As a result, "klnornHHIS sums will he released to ;tid the progress of civilization."
Hughes's idealism w:ts tempered with ;t healthy dose of pr:i.~!ll;tt isn1.
He well knew that his formula to reduce the world's mmt puwerful n:tvies would meet with stiff resistance from Ure:ll Brit<1in and Jap;m. Fur the next two and half months, Hughes prc.ssured and cajoled hi.s British and Japanese counterparts in puhlic meetings and behind closed do,ns. llc did not win every argument. Jap;m refused to destroy rhe Mutsu, t~ll·cing Hughes to adjust the requirements fnr the United States and c;re:tt Rritain to maintain :t rough tonnage ratio :mwng the three great powers. In early Febru;try 1922, Hughes :tnJ1llunced the agrLTI!ll'nt between the three m:tjur naval superpowers to dr;t'itictlly rcduCL' their fleets. The intcrnation:tl :tccord was hailed as an historic :tehie\'emenr, and Hughes emerged :ts one of the world's leading statesmen.
*
While Hughes received accolades for his disarmament conference triumph, Franklin D. Roosevelt was being fitted with 14-pound braces that extended from his heels to above his waist. The braces were the latest and harshest acknowledgment that Roosevelt had infantile paralysis and might never walk again. Only a year earlier, Roosevelt seemed destined for high puhlic office, perhaps the presidency. He was a descendant of one of the nation's most illustrious political families. His distant cousin, Theodore Roosevelt, had risen in the Republican Party to become president. Though Franklin's side of the family were Democrats, he had consciously patterned his political career on his cousin. Like Teddy, he had served as Assistant Secretary of the Navy and campaigned as his party's vice-presidential candidate. Though the Democrats' 1920 presidential ticket of Ohio governor James Cox and Roosevelt was trounced in the election, Franklin's political prospects remained bright. There was immediately talk that the handsome, athletic thirty-nine-year-old New Yorker might well head his party's national ticket in 1924 or 1928.
Roosevelt's high ambitions appeared to be irredeemably shattered on August 10, 1921. That was the day he went to bed with severe chills after a vigorous schedule of boating and swimming with his children near the family's summer estate on Campobello, a small island off the coast of Maine. He thought he had a bad cold, a diagnosis mistakenly confirmed by the local family doctor. Two days later, he had lost the ability to move his legs.
Dr. Robert Lovett, a faculty member at the Harvard Medical School and the nation's leading expert on infantile paralysis, was summoned to Campobello. After Lovett examined Roosevelt, who was paralyzed from the waist down, he was certain that his patient had contracted poliomyelitis.
In September, Roosevelt was transported to New York by private railroad car. The New York Times's front-page story informed the public, for the first time, that the Democratic Party's rising star had polio and was tu he treated at New York's Presbyterian Hospital hy Dr. George Draper, Dr. Lovett's protege. At first, Draper assured reporters that Roosevelt would walk again. Rut when his patient made no significant progress in the hospital, Draper hegan to doubt his early prognosis. He worried, moreover, that the extent of Roosevelt's debilitating disease might destroy the patient's psychological health as well as his hody.
Only Roosevelt himself possessed absolute confidence that he would fully recover. Ry October, when he was discharged from the hospital to return to the family's town house on East 65th Street, he could pull him-self up by a strap and, with assistance, swing himself into a wheelchair. A trained physiotherapist, Mrs. Kathleen Lake, came to the house three days a week, laid Roosevelt out on a stiff hoard, and stretched his legs. Franklin demanded that she administer the painful exercises every day. Throughout his ordeal, Roosevelt maintained his usual ebullience, gaily greeting family member and friend alike, often cheering them up.
A raging battle, meanwhile, was being fought in the family town house. Franklin's mother, Sara, had written off any future political career for her son and made plans for him to retire to Hyde Park, where she could lovingly care for him, as she had done for her elderly husband, James, before his death. But the imperious Sara faced a formidable challenge from Franklin's wife, Eleanor, and his wily and indef~1tigahle political adviser, Louis Howe, who had moved into the house to plot Roosevelt's political comeback. They aggressively challenged every subtle maneuver by Sara to bring Franklin permanently home to Hyde Park. Eleanor supervised Franklin's physical recovery, while Howe worked laboriously to preserve Roosevelt's political future, sending out a steady stream of press releases and maintaining close contact with Democratic leaders across the country.
Though Roosevelt remained paralyzed from the waist down, Howe continued to believe that he would be elected president of the United States.
Charles Evans Hughes's ascent to the nation's highest judicial office was predictable, if not preordained. No one was better equipped by training and experience to be Chief Justice of the United States. He had been a brilliant lawyer, a fearless investigator of corruption in the utilities and insurance industries, a progressive Republican governor of New York, and a former associate justice of the Supreme Court. In his extraordinary career, he had succeeded in almost every challenge he faced. The one exception: Roosevelt's paralysis discouraged virtually any serious thought of fu-turc elective office outside of the family's home on East 65th Strl'eL But by 1924, Roosevelt had mastered thl' usc of his heavy braces and prepared to resume his political career. At the l )emocratic National Convention in Madison Squ:1rc Uarden, he moved slowly toward to the podium, leaning heavily on the arm of his strapping sixteen-year-old son James. At the podium, RoosevL'It, though perspiring profusely from his exertion, beamed at the wildly applauding delegates, and delivered a rousing nominating speech for New York governor AI Smith. In confident, dulcet tones, he pr:1iscd Smith as the "'Happy Warrior' on the political battlefield." The delegates eruptl'd in thunderous applause, a stirring tribute to Roosevelt as much as to the man he had nominated. Four years later, Roosevelt was elected governor of New York, and, in 19)0, he was reelected by a landslide. Howe's political timetable c1lled for Ruosevelt to run for the presidency in 19)6, after Hoover had completed what Howe presumed would he his second term. But Hoover's ineffectual response to the nreat Depression destroyed his presidency and accelerated Howe's schedule. In November 1932, Roosevelt was elected presidl'nt, heating Hoover in the electoral college, 472-59.
Shmtly hefore his presidential inauguration on March 4, 19) 3, Roosevelt wrote a cordi:d note to Hughes, recalling their long friendship and expressing his admir<ltion and respect for the Chief Justice. He asked if he might break tradition and recite the entire presidential oath. Hughes readily agreed and wrote that he "especially prized the opportunity of being associated with you in our great American enterprise." ln his inaugural address, Roosevelt promised "direct, vigorous action" to lift the nation out of the disastwus economic depression. Immediately upon taking office, he transformed hts pledge of "a new deal fur the American people" into a fusillade of legislative proposals to the Democratically controlled Congress. Congress responded hy passing laws that shut down insolvent hanks, regulated stock sales, imposed industrial codes, subsidized farmers, and put more than a quarter million unemployed young men to wmk in the Civilian Conservation C:urps. Chief Justice Hughes and his fellow Hoover appointee, Associate Justice Owen Roherts, hdd the balance of judicial power throughuut the critical constitutional battles over New De<d legisbtion. By force of his commanding intellect and exempbry public service, Hughes was expected to lead the Court. But in which direction? He sometimes appeared to split the difference between the two warring factions, writing eloquent majority opinions protecting civil liberties hut frequently joining the Court's conservatives in striking down New Deal statutes.
Roosevelt publicly derided the Court's anti-New Deal decisions as rdics of a bygone "horse-and-buggy" era. His criticism did nothing to deter a Court majority that continued to declare one New Deal statute after another unconstitutional. Not even his triumphant Llndslide re-election appeared to influence the justices. Finally, in frustration and anger in early 19)7, the president proposed a so-called rcfmm plan that would allow him to appoint one new justice f(Jr every sitting justice seventy years of age or older. Because six justices were over seventy, including Hughes, the plan would have permitted FDR to stack the Court with new appointees favorahle to the New Deal. His radical proposal raised two unsettling constitutional questions: Should a president he <Jbk to mold a Court to meet his political goals? And should ideologically driven justices be allowed to frustrate the public will? Both questions arc as relevant in the twenty-hrst century as they were during the C)rcat Depression.
Roosevelt's Court-packing plan crcared a dramatic confrontation hetween the President and Chief Justice. Roosevelt promoted his plan as an effort to bring new energy to an overworked and aging Court. But he did a poor joh in disguising his true purpose: to undermine the power uf life-tenured justices to thwart his popular mandate. Hughes proved more than a match for Rousevelt in defending rhe Court. He deftly rebutted the president's claim that the justices were incapable of keeping abreast of the Court calendar, and the proposal was resoundingly defeated. In grudging admiration of Hughes, Roosevelt later said that the Chief Justice was the best politician in the country. That was hardly the way Hughes would have chosen to be remembered, though there was much truth in the president's remark.
Shortly after the defeat of his Court-packing plan, Roosevelt made the first of five appointments to the Court in less than three years. All of the new justices, from former Senator Hugo Black to Roosevelt's Attorney CJeneral, Frank Murphy, were Democrats and loyal New Dealers. Rut with each new Roosevelt appointee, Chief Justice Hughes seemed more assured in leading the Court. Administration insiders expected the president's third appointee, Harvard Law professor Felix Frankfurter, a Roosevelt confidant and scathing critic of the Court's anti-New Deal decisions, to challenge Hughes for the Court's intellectual leadership. Rut Frankfurter quickly deferred to Hughes and became one of his most avid admirers, ranking him as one of the nation's great chief justices.
Roosevelt was slow to recover from the Court-packing debacle. Emboldened conservative Democrats and Republicans blocked the liberal president's legislative agenda. Midway through his second term, Roosevelt appeared to he a weak, lame-duck president. Rut he never lost his confidence and, like Hughes, never ceded leadership. He outmaneuvered isolationists senators, many of whum had opposed his Court-packing pLm, to expedite essential aid to Ureat Britain as the Allies hovered on the brink of defeat at the start of the Second World War.
When Hughes announced his retirement from the Court in June 1941, Roosevelt issued a heartfelt letter of regret and invited the Chief Justice to lunch at the White House. They talked alone, sharing for the last time their common bond of national leadership at a critical point in American history.
